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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE OF A LIABILITY INCURRED WHEN BANKRUPT
OBTAINED PROPERTY FOR ANOTHER BY FALSE REPRESENTATIONs-Defendant

made grossly false statements regarding his financial condition to the plaintiff,
and induced the plaintiff to do construction work for a third party, payment
for which was guaranteed by the defendant. Third party failed to pay, and
plaintiff recovered a judgment against defendant on the guarantee. Subsequently defendant was discharged in bankruptcy. Plaintiff then brought suit
for false representation, basing his complaint on Section 17 of the Bankruptcy
Act,' which provides: "A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from
all his debts, except such as . . . are liabilities for obtaining property by false
pretenses or false representations . . ."

Held, that this debt was also dis-

charged, because the defendant had no financial interest in the construction work
obtained. Harrod Construction Corp. v. Englander, 273 N. Y. Supp. 136 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).

The important question before the court in the instant case was whether
the words, "obtaining property", 2 as used in the legislative provision stated
above, should be interpreted to mean "obtaining property for himself" or "obtaining property for anyone". The United States Supreme Court in a comparatively recent case,' in which the bankrupt obtained property for a corporation in which he was a large stockholder, decided it was not necessary that the
bankrupt directly receive the property to come within the meaning of the Act,
but expressly refused to give an opinion on the situation where the bankrupt
had no financial interest in the third party. On apparently the only occasion at
which this question was directly presented, prior to the instant case, the court
held that obtaining property for another was within the meaning of the Act, and
the debt was not discharged. 4 The presence of dicta on both sides of the question 5 suggests that either interpretation of the words is within the ordinary
use of the English language, so that the general context should determine the
meaning to be given them.6 The policy of the Bankruptcy Act, as embodied in
Many of the cases interpreting the
i. 42 STAT. 354 (1922), 11 U. S. C. A. § 35 (1926).
words "obtaining property" arise under another section of the Act in which these words are
used in the same way. "The judge shall . . . discharge the applicant unless he has . . .
(3) obtained money or property on credit upon a materially false statement in writing, made
by him to any person or his representative for the purpose of obtaining credit from such
person." 36 STAT. 839 (i9io), ii U. S. C. A. § 32 (b) (1926).
2. There is no doubt that "property" was obtained in this case. See Fidelity & Deposit
Co. of Md. v. Arenz, 290 U. S. 66 (1933). But cf. Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U. S. 558 (915).
3. Levy v. Industrial Finance Corp., 276 U. S. 281 (1928) ; cf. Royal Indemnity Co. v.
Cooper, 26 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928) ; In re Adams, 44 F. (2d) 67o (N. D. Tex.
193o) ; Hyland v. Fink, 178 N. Y. Supp. 114 (App. Div. 1919) ; (928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv.
863.
4. In re Kunkle, 40 F. (2d) 563 (E. D. Mich. 193o).
5. See In re Adams, 44 F. (2d) 670 (N. D. Tex. 193o), "The law seems to be now that
a broad and sensible view of the statute is to prevail, and that the property need not be obtained by the accused for himself. It is sufficient to prevent a discharge if the creditor was
induced by the bankrupt's false representations to deliver to another either for the benefit of
that other or for the benefit of the accused." But see In re Smith, I F. Supp. 847, at 849
(N. D. Ga. 1932), "In my opinion, this objection to the discharge is valid only when the
bankrupt has obtained money or property or credit for himself, or for some person or corporation in a transaction from which he himself will benefit."
6. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Levy v. Industrial Finance Corp., 276 U. S. 281, 283 (1928),
said, "A man obtains his end equally when that end is to induce another to lend to his friend
and when it is to bring about a loan to himself. It seems to us that it would be a natural use of
(266)
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its numerous provisions, is to discharge the debts of bankrupts who have lived
7
up to certain standards of honesty.

There appears to be very little difference

in moral culpability between obtaining property for oneself and obtaining it
for another; in addition, the chances that the attempted fraud will be successful
are r-easurably greater in the latter instance, since less suspicion attends representations made by those who do not stand to profit by them. On this basis
both should be given the same legal effect, and "obtaining property" should be
interpreted as "obtaining property for anyone". However, the New York court
8
in the instant case, although untrammeled by precedent, chose to open another
loophole in the bankruptcy law.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-AccEPTANcE OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE LAW

THRD
PERSONS UNIE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE OF ANOTHER STATE-Decedent,
an employee of a North Carolina express company, was killed in Virginia,
through the negligence of the defendant railroad. Decedent's administrator
1
sued in North Carolina under the wrongful death statute of Virginia. While
the action was pending, decedent's widow, sole beneficiary under the Virginia
statute, accepted compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
North Carolina. 2 If compensation had been accepted under the compensation
statute of Virginia, the action would have abated.' The express company's
insurance carrier, paying compensation, filed notice that it was subrogated to
the right of action against the defendant railroad and elected to continue the suit
in the name of the administrator. Held, that the insurance carrier might properly continue the suit. Betts v. Southern Ry., 71 F. (2d) 787 (C. C. A. 4 th,
1934).
It has long been settled that a statutory right of action for wrongful death
4
But the
may be sued on wherever the defendant can be properly served.
OF THE FORUM AS AFFECTING RIGHT TO PURSUE THE REMEDY AGAINST

courts have demanded strict compliance with the foreign statute as to the proper

party plaintiff.5 In the instant case, however, the suit was instituted by the
proper party, but thereafter the beneficiary of the action did an act in the forum
which under that law operated as an assignment of her interest in the action to
the insurance carrier of the employer.6 The logic of permitting the suit to
ordinary English to say that he obtained the money for a friend. So, when the statute speaks
simply of obtaining money, the question for whom the money must be obtained depends on
the context and policy of the Act."
7. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Arenz, 290 U. S. 66 (933) ; (1926) 75 U. OF
PA. L. REv. 8o.
8. The case which the court cited as binding authority, Gerdau Co. v. Radway, 222 App.
Div. 107, 225 N. Y. Supp. 284 (Ist Dep't 1927), can readily be distinguished., In that case
plaintiff sold birdseed to defendant, and defendant then resold the seed to the third party. After
the seed had been delivered to the third party, the defendant by false representations induced
plaintiff to extend the date of payment sixty days. In that case the third party had the property before the false representations were made. The court decided the case on the ground
that the extension of the time of payment was not "property" within the Act.
I. VA. CODE (1930) § 5786 et seq.
:2.N. C. CODE (1931) § 80o8i (h).
§ 1887 (12).
3. VA. CODE (930)

The statute provides that "acceptance of an award
hereunder . . . shall be a bar to proceeding further with the alternate remedy." Corrigin.
v. Stormont, 16o Va. 727, 170 S. E. 16 (933).
4. Dennick v. R. R., io3 U. S. II (1880) ; Weissengoff v. Davis, 26o Fed. 16 (C. C. A.
4th, 1919) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (Prop. Final Draft, 1932) § 428.
S. Oates v. Union Pacific Ry., 104 MO. 514, 16 S. W. 487 (1891) ; Usher v. West Jersey
R. R., 126 Pa. 206, 17 At. 597 (i889); REsTATE ENT, CoNFLCT OF LAws (Prop. Final
Draft, I932) §§ 431, 432.

6. N. C. Copa (1931) § 8081 (r).

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

continue with a new beneficiary is made clear by reference to recent theories
of conflict of laws, which reject the idea that the forum is applying the law
of another state out of "comity". Rather, it is part of the common law of the
forum state that rights accruing outside of the state will be enforced, provided
there be no inconsistent public policy and provided that adequate remedial machinery is present. 7 Here the court, while recognizing the widow's interest,
was also recognizing the assignment of that interest arising under the contract
between the employer and the decedent in the law of the forum.' The fact
that recovery will then enure to the benefit of a party unnamed by the Virginia
statute is an objection which may be answered by pointing out that the action
for wrongful death is substantially a tort action; that the statutes merely correct
a defect in the common law system of remedies; 9 and that hence as a tortfeasor, defendant should have no interest in how the recovery is distributed.'

CONTRACTS-ARBITRATION AND AWARD-BREAcH OF COLLATERAL AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE AS A DEFENSE TO ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROCEED WITH

THE PRINCIPAL CONTRACT-The plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract

which provided that all future disputes under the contract should be submitted
to a selected third party for arbitration. The contract expressly waived all
recourse to the courts. A dispute arose, but plaintiff refused to submit to
arbitration. Defendant then ceased work under the contract. Plaintiff sued
for damages and defendant set up the breach of the agreement to arbitrate as
a defense and entered a counterclaim for damages for the breach of the arbitration agreement. Held, that the breach of the agreement to arbitrate was a
defense to an action on the contract and that such breach gave rise to an action
for damages.' McCullough v. Clinch-Mitchell Construction Co., 71 F. (2d) 17
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934).

In dealing with arbitration agreements the federal courts have persistently
followed the common law doctrine of revocability established by Coke's dictum
in Vynior's Case.2 The instant case is unique in that it repudiates that doctrine
in toto. It is true that heretofore some exceptions to the strict common law
rule have been recognized in the federal courts; but these exceptions have been
strictly limited to two types of cases: (I) where the agreement to arbitrate is
executed, in which case the court will enforce the award,' (2) where the agreement to arbitrate is in the form of a condition precedent and is limited to ques-

tions of valuation (price or quality), leaving the general question of liability
7. GOODRICH, CoNsLIcr OF LAWS (1927) § 6; Dicey, Prvate Intermational Law (i89o)
7 L. Q. REv. 113. See RESTATEmENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS (Prop.
Rav. I, (89)
Final Draft, 1932) § 5.

6 L. Q.

8. N. C. CODE §§ 8o8i (k) and 8o8i (m) contain the usual provision that the Workmen's
Compensation Act is presumed to be part of the contract between employer and employee.
9. "It may well be that where a purely statutory right is created the special remedy provided by the statute for the enforcement of the right must be pursued, but where the statute
" Stewsimply takes away a common law obstacle to a recovery for an admitted tort, ..
art v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 168 U. S. 445, at 448 (1897).
I. The question o~f damages for breach of the agreement to arbitrate is not herein discussed, since the court apparently takes a position in accord with the common law rule. No
case has been found which allowed more than nominal damages for breach of an agreement
to arbitrate. See 48 Am. L. R.G. (N. s.) 485 (9oo).
2. 8 Co. 8oa, 8Ib, sub non Vivion v. Wilde, 2 Brownl. 290 (16o9). This is the leading
case for the proposition that executory arbitration agreements are revocable. See Simpson,
Specific Performance of Arbitration Contracts,supra p. 162.
3. United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S. 588 (igoo) ; see Choctow & M. R. Co. v. Newton,
14o Fed. 225, 233 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o5).
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to the courts. In such cases submission to arbitration has been held to be a
prerequisite to bringing an action.4 But where the agreement is to arbitrate
the question of general liability in future disputes, the courts have steadily
refused to allow a breach to be pleaded as a bar to an action arising from such
a dispate.5 The state arbitration statutes 8 have failed to modify this rule, since
the federal courts have held that they are not bound by such statutes.' The
federal Arbitration Act8 has had little effect, since it has been interpreted to
apply only to interstate commerce or admiralty casesY The decision in the
instant case cannot be explained in terms of either of the two exceptions to
the common law rule. It clearly involved an executory agreement to arbitrate
the question of general liability in disputes to arise in the future, all recourse
to the courts being expressly waived. The court took this clearly collateral
agreement, and while rejecting the part which ousts its jurisdiction as invalid,
held the remainder effective to bar an action on the general contract. In effect
this decision overthrows the entire body of federal authority, although strangely
enough the court did not seem to realize this, but spoke as though it were supported by precedent.-" It also provides by judicial fiat an effective legal sanction for such agreements in the federal courts. In view of the demands of
modern business," it would seem that the court was justified in repudiating a
doctrine which has been 12so bitterly assailed even by the courts which have felt
constrained to follow it.

COPYRIGHTS--INFRINGEMENT-PRIVILEGE
TO REPRODUCE Music IN
SOUND NEWSREEL WITHOUT PERMISSION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERs-Defendant
newsreel company recorded scene at the opening of a school, including the
playing by a band of twenty-eight bars of a copyrighted composition. Plaintiffs,
owners of the copyright, sought an injunction and damages for the filming and
exhibiting. The trial court found no infringement. Held, that the trial court
be reversed, since a "substantial part" of the composition had been reproduced
under circumstances not amounting to a "fair dealing" within the Copyright
Act.' Hawkes and Son (London), Ltd. v. Paramount Film Service, Ltd.,
[1934] I Ch. 593.
Defendant in the instant case laid principal stress upon the analogy between a newsreel and a newspaper, which has the privilege of using excerpts
4.

Hamilton v. Liverpool, London & Globe Ins. Co., 136 U. S. 242 (1889).
5. Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 264 U. S. lO9 (I9z4) ; United States Asphalt
Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 Fed. ioo6 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
6. For a compilation and analysis of these statutes, see SruRcias, CommERClAL. ARxRATIONS AND AwARDs (1930)

c. 12.

7. Lappe v. Wilcox, 14 F. (2d) 861 (N. D. N. Y. 1926).
8. 43 STAT. 883 (1925), 9 U. S. C. A. §§ I-I5 (192 6 ).
9. See Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F. (2d) 184 (D. Del. 193o).
io. The court cited United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S. 588 (igoo), and Choctow & M.
R. Co. v. Newton, 14o Fed. 225 (C. C. A. 8th, i9o5), both cited note 3 mstpra. These cases,
however, deal with executed agreementl and involve an attempt to upset the award. Thus
they are not relevant.
ii. "Information collected by the Department of Commerce over the past several years
has clearly showed that the substantial element of the American business public is overwhelmingly in favor of arbitration in the settlement of commercial disputes." HmmRT
HoovER, Foreword to YEARBoOK ON COmmERCIAL ARBITRATION (1927).
12. United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 22o Fed. ioo6
(S. D. N. Y. I915), cited note 5 supro. It was the criticism directed against the common law
rule in this case that started the agitation for legislative reform.
I. COPYRIGHT ACT, I & 2

Gro. V, c. 46,

§ I (2), §2 (I)

i (1911).
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from copyrighted works for fair purposes of review, comment, or summary.2
On the ground that there was here involved no element of review of the cornpbsition, the court refused to heed this argument.3 It is true that an intent to
infringe is not a necessary element of infringement of copyright, 4 and the fact
that no substantial damage has been shown will not necessarily preclude a finding of infringement.5 Furthermore, the finding of the court that here a "substantial part" of the composition was reproduced seems inescapable.' While
technical support for the holding may be gleaned from the above considerations, the increasing importance of the newsreel as a medium of information
makes it unfortunate that the court did not extend the analogy urged. It is a
well established doctrine of copyright law that a "fair use" may be made of
the protected material, 7 and the privilege of using portions for criticism or
review is a branch of that theory. Since the basis for the privilege is the
knowledge, and even desire, of the author that the work will be used and commented upon,' there would seem to be ample warrant for an extension to the
case of recording the use of the composition at a public event. 9 The courts
have wisely refrained from attempting strict definitions of what constitutes
infringement, 10 and they may be relied upon not to extend the doctrine of "fair
use" to cases in which such a reproduction involves a real danger to the rights
of the copyright owner.' Ill the absence of such a danger, it seems clear that
film companies should not be forced to substitute a desire to avoid burdensome
copyright fees for objective standards of evaluation in the selection of newsreel
material; it is to be hoped that courts in this country, if faced with facts similar
to those here involved, will decline to interpret statutory terms with a literalism
that does such violence to considerations of social values and the comparative
interests of the parties involved.12
2. The English act permits "any fair dealing with any work for the purposes of private
study, research, criticism, review, or newspaper summary". Id. at § 2 (I) i. There is no similar provision in the United States act [35 STAT. 1075 (I909), I7 U. S. C. A. (1926) ], but the
privilege has been recognized. See Story v. Holcombe, 4 McLean 3o6, 309 (C. C. Ohio
1847); G. Ricordi and Co. v. Mason, 201 Fed. 182, 183 (S.D. N. Y. 1911); Hill v. Whalen
and Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359, 36o (S.D. N. Y. 1914) ; HALE AND BENsoN, LAW OF THE

PRESS (2d ed. 1933) 472.

3. Principal case at 6o4, 6o8, 6o9.
4. Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U. S.191 (193i) ; Path6 Exchange, Inc. v.
International Alliance, 3 F. Supp. 63 (1932) ; Roworth v. Wilkes, I Campb. 94 (Nisi Prius
18o7); WEN., AMERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW (917) § 1048.
5. Buck v. Bilkie, 63 F. (2d) 447 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933)'; Weatherby v. International Exchange, Ltd., [1910] 2 Ch. 297. However, the question of damage may become relevant under the doctrine of "fair use". Folsom v. Marsh, 2 Story ioo (C. C. Mass. 1841) ; Mead v.
West Publishing Co., 8o Fed. 380 (D. Minn. 1896).
6. While there was confusion as to whether the music was audible for 2o or for 5o seconds, the finding of the court that the essential part of the melody was reproduced appears
correct and conclusive on the point.
7. Dun v. Lumbermen's Ass'n, 209 U. S. 20 (i9o8) ; Simms v. Stanton, 75 Fed. 6 (N. D.
Cal. 1896) ; Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L. J.Eq. 141 (Ch. 1839) ; DE WOLF,AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAW (1925) 142. Cf. Hanfstaengl v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. IOg.
8. Wan., op. cit. supra note 4, § 1134; see Chatterton v. Cave, 3 App. Cas. 483, 492

(0878).

9.Here, as in cases of quotation for purposes of review, the work gains publicity without
diminution of the rights of the copyright owner. See infra, note ii.
1O. Wan., op. cit. supra note 4, § 2OO3. The inevitably wide variance in the fact situations validates this policy.
ii. It seems clear that in the principal case, where the music was mingled with cheering
and other noises as part of an incidental sound background, the court's apprehension at the
possibility of the sound effects being utilized separately as musical interludes at cheap theatres
was unfounded.

Principal case at 604.

Cases might well arise, however, in which the cir-

cumstances would warrant consideration of such a possibility as a major factor.
12. A discouraging example of statutory interpretation is afforded in the opinion of
Slesser, L. J.: "I think this proviso must be dealt with strictly, and when it says 'newspaper
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CORPORATIONS-TRANSFER OF SHARES-LIABILITY TO ASSESSMENT OF UNRECORDED TRANSFEREE WHO HAS LIKEWISE MADE AN UNRECORDED TRANSFER

-The Superintendent of Banks sued to enforce defendant's statutory liability'
as a registered stockholder of an insolvent bank. Defendant attempted to implead his unrecorded transferee, who had immediately resold. Held, that an
unrecorded transferee who has disposed of his interest in stock before the
bank's closing is subject to no liability. Broderick v.Aaron, 264 N. Y. 368,
x91 N. E-. 19 01934).

The New York court reiterated its adherence to the American view, which
uniformly limits liability in such cases to the beneficial owner and the stockholder of record. 2 This view is based primarily upon the argument that the
3
It
transferee's liability should extend no further than his right to benefits.
would seem, however, that this argument should be equally applicable to the
original transferor; yet he is held liable, nonetheless, upon the practical ground
of the difficulty involved in discovering the one ultimately liable, the beneficial
owner.4 The English view surmounts the difficulty by holding each successive
transferee liable as surety to his immediate transferor. This doctrine has the
advantages of enabling the record holder to discover the beneficial _owner by
impleader,6 of protecting him against the possible irresponsibility of a subtransferee in choosing whom he had no voice, and of giving added security to
the creditors of the bank. The English view appears to be more practicable,
and more responsive to the realities of the situation. In view of the rapid
turnover of stock which frequently occurs, it is idle to say that a transferor
may relieve himself of liability 7 by insisting that the transferee be registered on
the corporation books.s In addition, the American cases complicate the problem
of the record owner by a strict construction of impleader statutes, requiring
that the impleader show a substantive duty owed to him by the one impleaded.9
summary' it means newspaper summary and nothing else. Now here there is neither a summary nor a newspaper, and it is impossible, I think, to hold that this case comes within that
protection." Principal case at 6o8.
I.N. Y. BANKING LAW (1916) §§ 8o, 120, imposing liability for the debts of a bank on
both the registered stockholder and the equitable owner.
2. Brinkley v. Hambleton, 67 Md. i69, 8 Atl. 9o4 (1887) ; Richards v. Robin, 175 App.
Div. 296, 162 N. Y. Supp. 12 (Ist Dep't I916), aff'd, 225 N. Y. 719, 12z N. E. 889 (1919);
Rogers v. Toland, 43 Pa. Super. 248 (910),

(i91o) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 188; and see Amer-

ican Alkali Co. v. Kurtz, 138 Fed. 392, 394 (C. C. A. 3d, i9o5).

3. See Rogers v. Toland, 43 Pa. Super. 248, 261 (191o) ; instant case at 378, 191 N. E.

at 22, sevible.
4. In the instant case, the original transferor's liability was of course statutory. But the
statute merely accorded legislative sanction to the principle regularly enforced in this country
by judicial decision. See cases cited supra note 2.
5. Kellock v. Enthoven, L. R. 9 Q. B. 241 (1874) ; Spencer v. Ashworth Partington &
Co., [1925] I K. B. 589; Thompson v. Daunt, ioN. S. W. L. R. 132 (1889).
6. Impleader statutes are coming into increasing use in this country. New York: N. Y.
CIv. PRACTISE (Cahill, 1931) § 193, subd. 2; Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, ig3i)
tit. 12, § 141.

7. It is true that a bona fide attempt by the registered holder to have the transfer recorded will relieve him of liability, even though the recording is never consummated. Jackson v. Freeman, 20 Ga. App. 767, 93 S.E. 284 (1917) ; State v. Ware, 82 Okla. 130, 198 Pac.
859 (1921) ; Bank of Georgetown v. Robinson, 134 Wash. 66, 234 Pac. 1025 (1925) ; Note
(1926) 45 A. L. R. 137, 145. But stock is usually transferred by a! mere endorsement in
blank on the certificate.
8. The corporation must answer in damages for refusal to transfer stock on its books to
the name of the new owner, at his demand. Bank of Maxeys v. Bank of Penfield, 24 Ga. App.
435, 101 S. E. 203 (1919) ; Wallace v. Citizens' State Bank of Windsor, 205 Ill. App. 7
(1917) ; Note (igIo) 58 U. OF PA. L. REV. 500.
9. May Co. v. Mott Ave. Corp., 121 Misc. 398, 2o1 N. Y. Supp. 189 (Sup. Ct. 1923);

Vinnacombe v. Phila., 297 Pa. 564, 147 Atl. 826 (1929).
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This construction prevents the registered holder from following the chain of
title through successive transferees to the present owner; or at any rate requires
that he institute one or more abortive suits before reaching a position in which
he can demand indemnification from the beneficial owner.' ° The court in the
instant case refused to avail itself of the opportunity to distinguish earlier
cases on the ground of the relatively recent impleader statutes, which obviate
the danger of successive suits between vendees. It is to be hoped that future
courts, if they go no farther, will at any rate recognize the desirability of a
more liberal attitude toward the process of impleading. 11

COURTS-JUR.ISDICTION OF STATE ADmINISTRATIVE OFFICIAL AS RECEIVER
FOR QUAsi-PuBLIc ASSOCIATION DESPITE PRIOR INSTITUTION OF RECEIVERSHIP
PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL CouRT-State Attorney-General, under statutory

authority,' obtained an order to have a local insurance corporation dissolved by
the Insurance Commissioner. Receivership proceedings had been commenced
previously in the federal court by a West Virginia shareholder. Held, that the
federal court was without jurisdiction and that the state court properly assumed
jurisdiction. Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v'. Penn General Casualty Co., 173
Atl. 637 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 1934).
Upon bill of a non-resident shareholder and with the consent of the association, the federal court appointed receivers for a Pennsylvania building and
loan association. The state Secretary of Banking petitioned the court to oust
these receivers and to turn over the assets to him.2 Held,3 that the federal

court had jurisdiction and that its exercise in denying the petition was proper.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Williams, 72 F. (2d) 509 (C. C. A. 3d,
1934).
Certiorarihas been granted in both these cases by the Supreme Court of
the United States.' Whereas the solution of the Williams case may be reached
by regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances 5 as unwarranted, the more serious problem of the existence of jurisdiction is squarely
io. Cf. Broderick v. Adamson, 148 Misc. 353, 265 N. Y. Supp. 8o4 (Sup. Ct. 1933),
(1933) 47 HARV. L. Ray. 354.
ii. For a discussion of impleading and stock assessment actions, see Cohen, Impleader:
Enforcement of Defendant's Rights Against Third Parties (1933) 33 CoL. L. Rav. 1147,
1176 et seq. Each transferor should be permitted to implead his immediate transferee as the
endorsers of a note are in turn impleaded until the one ultimately liable is reached.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 40, §§ 2o2, 2o6, 207.

Almost two years before, the Secretary of Banking had found the association to be in
an "unsafe and unsound condition" and had placed its activities on a rigidly restricted basis,
under authority of PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 7, § 20. Such orders look to eventual
rehabilitation or dissolution of the association with the greatest measure of protection to the
shareholders and creditors in the interim. It is to be noted that in the Penn Casualty case,
while the Insurance Commissioner has similar supervisory and regulatory powers, PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 193o) tit. 40, §§ 201 ff., his investigation of the insurance company and negotiations for a plan of rehabilitation had been in progress only about two months when the bill
in the federal court was filed.
3. Affirming decision of the district court sub norn. Elson v. Mortgage B. & L. Ass'n, 4
F. Supp. 779 (E. D. Pa. 1933).
4- U. S. L. WEEK, Oct. 23, 1934, at Ii, Nos. 431, 394.
5. Beside the fact that building and loan associations are "quasi-public" in that they are
subject to rigid state supervision and carefully drafted laws have been enacted .for the proper
carrying on of their activities and orderly and economical dissolution, if necessary (Building
and Loan Code, Pa. Laws 1933, no. io8, p. 457), the fact that this was a consent receivership
instigated by a non-resident shareholder with a comparatively slight interest in the association
might indicate an unwarranted attempt on the part of the association's officers to escape the
state jurisdiction.
2.
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raised by the Penn Casualty case, since it is well recognized that where two
courts have concurrent jurisdiction, that of the first court exercising it becomes
exclusive." The wisdom of permitting the federal court to appoint receivers
where the association is of a quasi-public character and where the state in which
it w2 z organized and performs its functions has provided in the public interest
a comprehensive system of supervision and administration may well be questioned. This is especially true where the receivership is by consent, for the
procedure may become a mere device by which the association's officials, actuated by the likelihood of their own appointment as receivers, 7 remove the
case from the control of the public officials of the state. But while the desirability of basing federal jurisdiction in general on diversity of citizenship has
been strongly doubted," the only limitations on its scope are those enunciated
by Congress' and the federal judiciary '°---and no distinction has been made
because of the quasi-public character of the association. Hence, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will attempt to aid the state authorities in the
Penn Casualty case by adopting a state-made limitation upon federal jurisdiction
and overthrowing a practice long adopted; but by limiting the discretion of the
federal court in exercising its jurisdiction where the association is quasi-public
in nature, a practical solution of the problem may be reached in the future
through prompt intervention in federal receivership proceedings by the state
officials.

MORTGAGES-INSURAWCE-PRIORITY OF SECOND MORTGAGEE TO INSURER
SUBROGATED TO RIGHTS OF THE FIRST MORTGAGEE-Appellant fire insurance

company issued to mortgagor a policy containing "standard mortgagee clause",

which provided, inter alia, that: (I) loss was payable to first mortgagee and
second mortgagee, the appellee, "as interest may appear"; (2) the insurance
was not to be invalidated by any act or omission of mortgagor; (3) after paying
loss and claiming nonliability as to mortgagor, insurer shall be subrogated to
all rights of insured or may pay mortgagee the whole debt and receive full
assignment; (4) but no such subrogation shall impair the right of the mortgagee to recover full amount of his claim. After fire, appellant claimed nonliability as to mortgagor, paid first mortgage in full, and received an assignment.
Held, that the appellee's mortgage is a lien superior to appellant's. Mutual Fire
Insurance Co. v. Dilworth, 173 Atl. 22 (Md. 1934).
The succession of an insurer who pays a loss to the mortgagee, to the
rights of the latter in the mortgage debt, is grounded on the equitable doctrine
of subrogation.' The "standard mortgagee clause" specifically secures this right
6. Proceedings first begun in state court. O'Neil v. Welch, 245 Fed. 261 (C. C. A. 3d,
1917). Proceedings first begun in federal court. Mitchell v. Maurer, 69 F. (2d) 233 (C. C.
A. 9th, 1934).

7. See Trieber, The Abuses of Receiverships (igio) ig YALE: L. J. 275.
8. FRANxFuRTER and LANDIS, THE BusiNEss OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927)

292;

Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdictio (1928) 41 HARv. L. REv. 483, 510;
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAgv. L. REV. 345, 378.
9. Congress has in a general way prohibited suits in the federal courts on choses in action
which have been assigned, unless the assignor could have brought suit in the federal courts,
36 STAT. 1091 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41, par. I (1927) ; required the amount in controversy
exclusive of costs and interest to exceed $3,oo, 36 STAT. 1087 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41,
par. I (1927) ; restricted the federal courts in enjoining action of the state courts, 36 STAT.
1162 (igin), 28 U. S. C. A. 379 (1927).

io. Where there is a plurality of plaintiffs and defendants or both, a federal court has
no jurisdiction unless each plaintiff could sue each defendant in a federal court. Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. i8o6).
I. 7 COOLEY, BRIEFS ON INSURANCE (2d ed. 1928) 6117 et seq.
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to an insurer contracting to pay the loss to mortgagees, and the clause has been
enforced.2 Commonly, the mortgagor obtains the policy for the benefit of the
mortgagees at their request. In such case, before subrogation to the rights of
the mortgagee is granted the insurer, the latter must prove nonliability as to
the mortgagor, 3 and pay the entire mortgage debt. 4 Compliance entitles the
insurer to claim, by virtue of the equitable assignment effected by subrogation,
all securities held by the insured,5 and this claim is re-enforced by the provision
in the mortgagee clause for a formal assignment of the mortgage. 6 But in the
principal case, to permit the insurer to enforce this mortgage as a prior lien
against the remainder of the premises, would result in requiring the property
to satisfy the first mortgage twice--once by the destruction of enough of the
buildings to warrant insurer paying the first mortgagee in full, and again by the
enforcement of the assigned first mortgage-before the second mortgagee could
begin to enforce his lien. The obvious injustice of this result is emphasized
by recognition that a "conservative" first mortgage generally represents sixty
per cent. of the value of the premises. The court recognized this and based its
decision on the ground that an opposite holding would in effect invalidate the
insurance as to the second mortgagee and impair his right to recover his full
claim, in direct violation of the mortgagee clause. Admittedly, the decision is
inconsistent with the rule that a subrogee stands in the shoes of the mortgagee
to enforce all his rights and priorities. 7 But it is justly supported by the more
fundamental principle that subrogation, being an equitable right, will not be
enforced when enforcement would work an injustice. 8 Thus, the mortgagee
obtains the protection he specifically sought in the terms of the policy," and the
insurer must
wait its turn to recoup a loss, the risk of which it was paid to
0
assume.'

TORTS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF LAND OCCUPIER FOR CONDITION OF
PREMISES TO INFANT ENTERING

THEREON-Defendant's areaway, with the

consent of the municipal authorities, extended five feet from the building line
into the public way. Plaintiff, a child of four years, descended into this areaway to retrieve a ball. He dislodged a heavy flower box, which fell upon and
2. Mosby v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 242, 225 S. W. 725 (192o) ; Heilbruftn v. German Alliance Ins. Co., 15o App. Div. 67o, 135 N. Y. Supp. 769 (Ist Dep't 2912).
3. Sun Ins. Office v. Heiderer, 44 Co. 293, 99 Pac. 39 (19o9) ; Frontier Mortgage Co.
v. Heft, 146 Md. 2, 125 Atl. 772 (2924).
4. Carroll v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 28 Idaho 466, 154 Pac. 985 (1916) ; Oregon Mortgage Co., Ltd. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 122 Wash. 183, 22o Pac. 385 (1922).
5. 5 POiEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th ed. 2929) §§ 2343, 2351.
6. Whether the subrogee can, without this provision, demand a formal assignment, see
3 id. § 1214.
7. Kimberley & Carpenter, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 6 F. Supp. 255 (D. Del.
1934); Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co., 220 Ala. 428, 125 So. 807 (2930);
Grangers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers' Nat. Bank, 164 Md. 441, 165 Atl. 185 (2933) ; 5

PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 5, § 2351.
8. American Bonding Co. v. Welts, 193 Fed. 978 (C. C. A. 9th, 1912); Makeel v. Hotchkiss, 29o IIl. 311, 6o N. E. 524 (902).

q. That this is a prime consideration, see Tarrant Land Co. v. Palmetto Fire Ins. Co.,
220

Ala. 428, at 432, 125 So. 807, at 81I (293o).

There the court, in reconciling its decision

refusing to grant second mortgagee priority over the insurer-assignee of the first mortgagee,
with the decision in Perretta v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., io6 Misc. 91, 174 N. Y.
Supp. 131 (Sup. Ct. 2929), aff'd, 188 App. Div. 983, 177 N. Y. Supp.'923 (3d Dep't igig),
squarely in accord with the principal case, held this to be the distinguishing feature.
io. This decision clearly demonstrates that encumbrances on the premises increase the
risk in those cases where the insurer might plead nonliability as to the owner. But cf. Cohen,
Encumberhig Realty as Affecting the Moral Hazard in Fire Insrance (924) 24 Col-, L.
REv. 605.
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crushed his leg. Held, that although defendant owed an affirmative duty of
care to the plaintiff for the safe condition of the premises, the evidence was
insufficient to establish a breach of such duty. Sanders v. Rand Realty Corp.,
241 App. Div. 408, 272 N. Y. Supp. 745 (ist Dep't 1934).

The court rested its decision squarely upon an earlier opinion of the Court
of Appeals in Tymon v. M. L. S. Construction Co.,' a case involving almost
identical facts. While these holdings seem correct, the concept of defendant's
duty is a novel one. Since plaintiff's entry was without defendant's consent,2
and of no advantage to him,3 orthodox concepts would have required a mere
passive duty respecting the condition of the premises. 4 Instead of affixing to
plaintiff the label of trespasser, 5 licensee, 6 or invitee,' the Tynon case simply
stated that, under the circumstances, plaintiff's entry was privileged and that it
was not subject to the risk that the land was unsafe. A similarly broad step
has been taken by this court in imposing affirmative care toward officers who
enter in discharge of their public duties.8 The adoption of the rule in the Tynwn
case was undoubtedly influenced by the fact that defendant's user of the areaway was itself in the nature of a license, in return for which he must surrender
some immunities incident to the occupation of land.9 But with the increasing
breakdown of the theory that property rights are inviolate, 10 justice and policy
would seemingly permit the extension of such rule to the case of private lands,
especially as respects children." It is obvious that defendant can foresee the
entrance of a child to retrieve his penny,' 2 his hat,'" or his ball.1" It is equally
obvious that no additional burden will be imposed upon the land occupier, since
he is already under a duty to his business guests to keep in safe condition those
parts of his premises which he may reasonably expect such guests to use.'- So
1. 262 N. Y. i61, 186 N. E. 429 (933).
2. The nonexistence of consent usually brands the person entering as a trespasser. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES (1929) § 199. See authorities cited infra note 5.
3. This fact negatives the possibility that plaintiff is an "invitee". RESTATEMENT, TORTS,
CO.MMENTARIES (1929) §202. Cf. cases and texts cited infra note 7.

4. For a definition of and distinction between "passive" and "active" duties, see Note

(1927) 49 A. L. R. 778.
5. "Trespasser" is defined in

RESTATEMENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES

(1929)

§ i99.

For

a discussion of the duty owed a trespasser by the occupier of premises, see Ciarmataro v.
Adams, 275 Mass. 521, 176 N. E. 6Io (I93I) ; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Ginn, 3 P. (2d) 714 (Okla.
1931) ; HARPER, TORTS (I933) §§ 90-94 and cases therein cited.
6. "Licensee" is defined in RESTATEMENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES (1929) § 200. For the

duty of the land occupier toward a licensee, see Gravelle v. New York etc. R. R., 282 Mass.
262, 184 N. E. 717 (1933) ; HARPER, TORTS (I933) §§ 95, 96. New York has repeatedly denied
the existence of any affirmative duty toward "bare licensees". Mendelowitz v. Meisner, 258
N. Y. I81, 179 N. E. 378 (1932) ; Fisher v. Amity Harbor Corp., 237 App. Div. 196, 261 N.
Y. Supp. 41 (2d Dep't 1933).

7. "Invitee" is defined in RESTATEMENT, ToRTs, COMMENTARIES (1929) §202. The occupier's duty toward such persons is discussed in De Lee v. Pardy Construction Co., 249 N.
Y. IO3, 162 N. E. 599 (1928); Lake Brady Co. v. Krutel, 123 Ohio St. 570, 176 N. E. 226
(i93i) ; Coxey v. Guala, 171 Atl. 484 (Pa. Super. 1934) ; HARPER, TORTS (I933) §§ 97-99.
8. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (192o). In absence of a

statute, a policeman or fireman who enters on premises in the discharge of his duty is generally held to be a mere licensee to whom the occupant owes only a passive duty. Note (192I)
13 A. L. R. 637.
9. See Donnelly v. City of Rochester, 166 N. Y. 315, 59 N. E. 989 (igoi) ; Fagan v.
Bishop, 176 App. Div. 777, 162 N. Y. Supp. 893 (Ist Dep't I917).
Io. See Bohlen, Duty of a Landowner Toward Those Entering His Premises of Their
Ovn Right (1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. REv. 237 et seq.; id. at 340.
ii. That tort law is relaxed in favor of infant trespassers, see the "attractive nuisance"
cases. Note (1929) 6o A. L. R. 1444.
12. Tyrnon v. M. L. S. Construction Co., 262 N. Y. 161, 186 N. E. 429 (933).
13. Fagan v. Bishop, 176 App. Div. 777, 162 N. Y. Supp. 893 (Ist Dep't 1917).
14. The instant case.
15. Supra note 7.
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long as the land occupier is not held accountable for injuries arising in a manner
which he could not reasonably anticipate-as in the instant case-the creation
of this new duty seems entirely proper. 16

TORTS-PARENT AND CIILD-RIGHT OF CHILD TO RECOVER DAMAGES
FROM ONE WHO HAS ENTICED His MoTHER-Plaintiff, alleging that de-

fendant had deprived him of his mother's "affection, comfort and motherly
love" while he was an infant, by enticing and harboring his mother, sued defendant for alienation of affections. Held, that plaintiff has stated no cause
of action. Morrow v. Yannantuono, 152 Misc. 134, 273 N. Y. Supp. 912 (Sup.
Ct. 1934).
It is clear that, before plaintiff can assert a cause of action, he must have a
right of action; I consequently, this case, unique so far in Anglo-American
law,' involves the legal phases of a child's interest in his parents' affections.
Authoritative writers, admitting such interest, agree that it is unsecured by the
law.' Yet the common law has long protected a husband's "property" in his
wife's affections,' and comparatively recent decisions have recognized a corresponding claim on the part of a wife.' While courts generally regard this
right to "consortium" " as arising solely from the marriage relation,7 analysis
will elicit the discovery that it stems from the sociological rather than the con16. Once it is established that a person is privileged to enter private lands for a private
purpose, the RESTATEMENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES (1929) § 215, is authority for the imposition of such duty upon the land occupier. This section is cited with approval in Tymon v. M.
L. S. Construction Co., 262 N. Y. i6I, 166, 186 N. E. 429, 430 (1933).
I. A right is merely a legally protected interest. A cause of action consists of a right in
one party plus a corresponding duty in and a breach thereof by another party. See POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 347; Wildman v. Wildman, 70 Conn. 700, 41 Atl. I (1898).
2. The principal point is in fact found in one reported case, but it arose collaterally, in
relation to an adult child, and the court, after giving it brief mention, expressly withheld
opinion. Coulter v. Coulter, 73 Colo. 144, 150, 214 Pac. 400, 402 (1923).
Holdings most
closely analogous are presented in two isolated cases where a mother sued for alienation of
her child's affections. Relief was denied in both. Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 21o N.
W. 926 (1926) ; Miles v. Cuthbert, 122 N. Y. Supp. 703 (Sup. Ct. S. T. 19o9). The former
case is commented on in (1927) 27 COL. L. REv. 604; (1927) 25 MICH. L. REV. 682; (927)
ii MINN. L. Rw. 570; and Note (927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 771.
3. See 3 BL. CoMui. *143; WIG11ORE, SUMMARY OF THE PRINCIPLES OF TORTS (1912)
§36; CLARK, TORTS (1922) §20I; Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations
(1916) 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 185.
4. What is conceded to be the earliest case enforcing the husband's right to his wife's
society, aid and affection is Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes 577 (C. P. 1745).
5. Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. I, IS AtI. lO27 (1889); cf. Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N. Y.
156, 14o N. E. 227 (1923), with illuminating discussion in CARDOzo, GROWTEr OF THE LAW
(1924) 105 et seq.
6. "Consortium" originally conveyed the idea of "services" [see HARPER, TORTS (1933)
§ 254], and was applied exclusively to the marital relation. But this meaning was soon discarded, and the interest merely in affections, etc., recognized. Heermance v. James, 47 Barb.
120 (N. Y. 1866); see Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortiun4 (1923) 22
MICH. L. REv. I; Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium (193o) 3o CoL. L. REV. 65I. Cf.
Bigaouette v. Paulet, 134 Mass. 123, 124 (1883) ; Longe v. Saunders, 246 Mass. 159, i6o, 140
N. E. 741 (1923). Even in actions for seduction, loss of the child's services was paramount
when a parent sued the seducer, but here too the modert tendency is to allow recovery for
the mere invasion of the parental interest, without requiring plaintiff to show loss of services
either presumptively or in fact. Kirkpatrick v. Lockhart, 2 Brev. 276 (S. C. 18o9) (a remarkably advanced case); Howell v. Howell, 162 N. C. 283, 78 S. E. 222 (1913) ; Pickle v.
Page, 252 N. Y. 474, 169 N. E. 65o (193o) ; HARPER, TORTS (1933) § 263.
7. See Pyle v. Waechter, 202 Iowa 695, 70, 2io N. W. 926, 929 (1926) ; Hodge v. Wetzler, 69 N. J. L. 490, 494, 55 Atl. 49, 50 (1903).
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tractual aspect of matrimony. 8 Therefore, in view of the broad modern outlook on domestic institutions, there seems no theoretical reason for not granting
the child a right to the "consortium" of his parents. Numerous practical obstructions, however, inhibit application of this reasoning, the more obvious
difficiIties being: (I) Possibility of a multiplicity of suits, since the husband
has his action, and extension of the principal basis thereof would usually include other minor or dependent children; 9 (2) Possibility of extortionary
litigation, for this action, always susceptible to fraud, would become even more
so by virtue of its numerical increase and the relative tenuousness of the child's
relationship; 10 (3) Inability to define the point at which the child's right would
cease, inasmuch as the status itself hypothesizes mutability (i. e., a spouse is,
barring extraordinary circumstances, always a spouse, but the very nature of
childhood implies an eventual change to adulthood); (4) Inability of a jury
adequately to cope with the question of damages, first, because injuries like
that now under discussion are hard to measure in money and courts are averse
to permitting the more or less conjectural awards based on mental suffering,1 '
and second, because damages thus assessed are apt to overlap, the number and
ages of children ordinarily being noted in a parent's action. 2 On the whole it
is perhaps best to refuse the remedy here sought, at any rate in the present
state of the law; hence the court in the instant case seems to have reached the
most politic solution of a problem meriting serious consideration.

TRusTs-DISTRIBUTION

OF

TRUST

TRuSTEE's BOND FOR Loss OCCASIONED

FUNDs-LIABILITY

OF

SURETY

ON

By FAILURE OF DEPOSITORY AFTER

ACCOUNT-Trustee for the
sale of real estate deposited the proceeds in a carefully selected bank. The
court confirmed his final account. Thereafter one entitled in distribution
under the order made demands on the trustee, who because of illness and a
request for a certain form of release delayed nine days before giving a check.
The depository failed immediately thereafter. Distributee sued surety on trustee's bond. Held, that surety was liable for loss resulting from failure of depository. Suratt v. State, to Use of Bollinger, 173 Atl. 573 (Md. 1934).
The majority of the court held the surety liable irrespective of negligence
on the part of the trustee, on the theory that the decree confirming the final
account ended the trust management, leaving the trustee, "under the single
peremptory obligation to deliver over the assets".' A concurring judge agreed
with the result on the ground that there was sufficient evidence to hold the
trustee negligent, but disagreed with the theory of absolute liability. The law
is well settled that, before the confirmation of the final account, the trustee is
liable upon the failure of the depository only if guilty of some misconduct, as
ORDER OF COURT CONFIRMING TRIUSTEE's FINAL

8. See Noel v. Ewing, 9 Ind. 37, 50 (1857) ; Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87, IOI (1856).
See also ScHouLER, DomEsTic RELATIONS (6th ed. 1921) § 1073, P. 1346; BISHOP, MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE (6th ed. 1881) bk. I, c. I, § 16. CGtra: McCreery v. Davis, 44 S. C. 195, 22
S. E. 178 (894). Cf. Adams v. Palmer, 5I Me. 480, 483 (1863). Cf. also CODE CIVIL
FRANCAs (1804) art. 2o3: "Les &poux contractent ensemble par le fait seul du mariage,
'obligation de nourrir, entretenir et 6lever leurs enfants."
9. Principal case at 135, 273 N. Y. Supp. at 913.
io. See McCollister v. McCollister, 126 Me. 318, 321, 138 Atl. 472, 473 (1927) ; Miller v.
Levine, 13o Me. 153, 16o, 154 At. 174, 178 (1931); Brown, The Action for Alienation of
Affections (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 472, 505.
ii. Cf. HARPER, loc. cit. supra note 6; Pound, supra note 3, at 194.
12. Principal case at 136, 273 N. Y. Supp. at 914; Pound, loc. cit. supra note II.
I. Principal case at 574.
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where he deposits the funds to his personal credit, or where he fails to use
reasonable care in the selection of such depository.2 Therefore the ultimate
inquiry is as to the effect of the confirmation on the relationship of the trustee
and the beneficiary with respect to the fund. There appears to be no authority
in the United States or England holding that upon a decree confirming his final
account the trustee becomes a debtor to the beneficiary.3 If in such a situation
the liability arises out of a breach of duty as debtor (as distinguished from
liability based on a breach of duty as trustee), as the language of the court
implied,' it is difficult to see how the decision may be supported, since the bond
on which defendant was surety was conditioned on performance of trustee's
duties. Such a view is not only illogical, but is highly disadvantageous to the
beneficiary, since a normal consequence would be the possession of the equitable
as well as legal title to the res by the "trustee".' On the other hand, to hold
that the confirming decree places a peremptory, absolute duty on the trustee as
trustee to pay immediately would put too great a burden on the trustee; 6 a
burden inconsistent with the traditional scope of the duties of the trustee with
regard to the custody of trust property.' To hold the trustee to the usual duty
of high care would seem to reach best the proper result in problems arising out
of the distribution of the trust fund.' Moreover, such a view would be consistent with the result on the facts of the principal case.9
2. Hunt v. Appellant, 141 Mass. 515, 6 N. E. 554 (1886) ; Jacobus v. Jacobus, 37 N. J.
Eq. 17 (1883) ; In re Law's Estate, 144 Pa. 499, 22 Atl. 831 (1891) ; see Chancellor v. Chancellor, 177 Ala. 44, 58 So. 423 (1912). See cases collected in I PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed.
1929) § 443, and in LEwIN, TRUSTS (13th ed. 1928) 275.
3. But cf. Lunham v. Blundell, 27 L. J. Ch. (1858) (trustee ordered to transfer funds to
new trustees) ; Wilkinson v. Bewick, 4 JUR. (N. s.) iolO (1858) (trustee ordered to pay
funds into court). In both cases the court held liability, calling the trustees debtors. An
analysis of the cases shows that in both the trustees were obviously at fault and would have
been liable if held only to a standard of high care.
4. Nowhere in the opinion does the majority of the court expressly say that the relationship after the confirmation changed to that of debtor and creditor. The dissenting judge
says flatly that the majority opinion held the effect of the court's confirmation of the final
account was to convert the trustee into a debtor. Principal case at 578.
5. While a beneficiary might be protected-even if at the expense of logic-under a set

of facts similar to those of the principal case, consider his position in the following hypothetical cases:
(i) Trustee owes money to bank wherein the funds are deposited to his credit as trustee
and bank attempts to set off this debt against the claim for the funds.
(2) Trustee draws a check on depository to apply to personal uses, the bank having notice that he intends to use the check or its proceeds for his own purposes. Bank cashes the
check against the fund. Beneficiary sues the bank.
(3) The res of the trust is a deposit of $2000 in an insolvent bank. Shortly prior to the
day the court confirms trustee's final account the bank announces that it is able to pay depositors fifty per cent. of their deposits, and that checks will be sent accordingly to depositors.
On such a basis the res would be worth $Iooo. No checks are sent out by the bank for one
month during which bank's assets suddenly rise in value so that it is able to liquidate deposit
claims in the amount of seventy-five per cent. Trustee c!aims the enhancement in value of
the claim against the bank.
6. Once the court saddles the trustee with an "absolute duty", in the event that a loss
follows the non-performance of this duty, ". . . the court does not acquit him because the
loss was more immediately caused by some event wholly beyond the control of the trustee,
such as fire, lightning, or other accident; or because of conduct in the nature of contributory
negligence on the part of the cestui que trust." Lavi, TRUSTS (13th ed. 1928) 953.
7. "To use the same degree of diligence and care in the execution of his office that a man
of ordinary prudence would exercise in the management of his own affairs." Id. at 272.
8. In the principal case before the court confirmed the final account the res was a claim
against the bank. The court's decree ordered him to liquidate the claim and to distribute the
proceeds to beneficiary. The fairest solution of the problem would appear to be to hold the
trustee to a high degree of care in liquidating the claim against the bank.
9. The facts of the principal case are such that a jury might reasonably find the trustee
negligent in delaying the liquidation of the claim against the bank: The account was con-
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WILLS-REVOCATION-EFFECT OF REVOCATION OF A WILL PURPOSELY
EXECUTED IN EXERCISE OF A SPECIAL PowER-Testatrix, domiciled in Italy,

exercised by will in favor of her husband a special power of appointment which
she had under an English uncle's will. Testatrix's will was valid under both
Eng'ish and Italian law. At her request by letter, her English solicitor destroyed
the will, an admitted compliance with Italian law on revocation of wills. On
her death, her husband claimed admission to probate in England of the will, on
the ground that by English law destruction must take place in testatrix's presence to constitute revocation. Held, that in absence of authority, Italian, rather
than English, law on revocation would be applied in order to give effect to
testatrix's intention, and therefore probate would be denied. Velasco v. Coney,

[1934] P. 143.
The English Wills Act of 1837,' which has had a widespread effect on
American statutory law and judicial decision,2 permits revocation by destruction
only if in the presence of the testator.' It has become established that the rules
relating to revocation of wills likewise control wills exercising a power of appointment.4 In the instant case, the court, to evade the terms of the Wills Act,
chose to apply the leo loci, that of testatrix's domicil, wherein her "mandate" '
would constitute a valid revocation of the will. But even with this evasion for
the sake of "reason and justice" and "giving effect to the intention of testatrix",
another obstacle in the form of a settled legal principle remains to point to the
unsoundness of the decision: the law of the domicil of a donor of a power
created by will controls in determining the validity of the execution of such
power.6 Thus, in this unique situation, even assuming for argument that the
court justifiably should have applied Italian law to circumvent the revocation
clause of the Wills Act,7 still the ultimate deciding factor in favor of the applicafirmed on Feb. I, 1933, at a time when a great many banks throughout the country were in
precarious positions. Trustee, a practicing attorney, should have known this. Nor was the
delay for the release extenuating. While it is customary for the trustee to demand a release,
when he distributes property in compliance with an order of the court he has no legal right
as against one clearly a beneficiary to a release since the order itself is considered an indemnification. Chadwick v. Heatley, 2 Coll. 137 (Ch. 1845) ; see Austin v. Ennis, 187 S. W. 599

(Mo.

1916) ; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS

(7th ed.

1929) §§ 922, 924; LEwiN, TRUSTS (13th ed. 1928)

475.

I. I Vicr. c. 26, §20 (1837).
2. Bordwell, The Statute Law of Wills (1929) 14 IowA L. REv. 283 at 287; Note (1919)

3 A. L. R. 833 at 835; for a collection of cases see 40 Cyc. 1184, n. 15.
3. Cf. In the goods of Dadds, I Deane Ecc. 290 (Pr. Ct. 1857); Andrew v. Motley, 12
C. B. (N. s.) 513 (1862) ; Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2 P. D. 251 (1877); In the goods of Eyre,
[19o] 2 Ir. R. 540.
4. 2 JARMfAN, WILLS (7th ed. 193o) 811; see Hawksley and Hughes v. Barrow, L. R. I P.
& D. 146, 152 (1866) ; In the goods of Joys, 3o L. J. (N. s.) 169 (P. i86o) semble; cf. In re
Wilkinson's Settlement, [19171 I Ch. 62o.
5. "The signed authority in the handwriting of testatrix to the English solicitor to de-

stroy her will is called a "mandate". This is effective in Italian law to revoke the will, and
. . . would have been effective so to do even if the solicitor to whom it was addressed bad
not actually destroyed the will, provided that he had duly received the letter." Instant case at
147. Cf. 22 DiGEsrTo ITALIANO, Parte quarta, Successioni Testamentarie 1140.
6. THoPsoN, WILLS (1916) § 46; see Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Dunnell, 34
R. I. 394, 405, 83 Atl. 858, 862 (1912) ; In the goods of Alexander, 29 L. J. (N. s.) 93 (P.

i86o) ; Pouey v. Hordern, [19oo] I Ch. 492; In re M~gret, [igoI] I Ch. 547. "This rule is
based upon the theory that the person authorized by the donor to execute the power is merely
the medium through which the donor designates the person who is to receive the benefit of
the power; and that the latter takes from the donor under the original will and not under the
appointment by the person authorized to execute the power." THoMPsoN, loc. cit. supra;
Pouey v. Hordern, supra.
7. This assumption is supported by the instant case at 148, and apparently by two other
cases, Walcott v. Ochterlony, I Curt. 58o (Pr. Ct. 1837) seMble, and Maharajah Pertab
Narain Singh v. Maharanee Subhao Kooer, L. R. 4 Ind. App. 228 (1877). However, the
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tion of English law should have been the rationale that since the power could
necessarily any revocation of
be exercised only by compliance with English law,
8
In the absence of controlling
law.
English
to
conform
must
that appointment
authority, the court might well have grounded its decision on the framework
of analogous situations in existing law, by adherence to (I) the revocation clause
of the Wills Act, and the numerous English 9 and American 1o cases on revocation of wills approximating in varying degrees the facts at hand, and (2) the
11
law on the exercise of testamentary powers.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAwS-CNSTRUcTION-DEFINITION OF EMPLOYER'S OBLIGATION-Plaintiffs, as dependents of an employee killed in the

business of his employer, had received a compensation award against employer's
insurance company. Subsequently the employer died, but no claim was filed by
plaintiffs at the administration of his estate. Still later, the insurance company
became insolvent, whereupon the amounts still due were commuted into a lump
sum. Plaintiffs then sued distributees of employer's estate to obtain sums so
commuted. The Compensation Act requiring employers to carry insurance
provided inter alia: "Any proceeding brought by an injured employee or his
dependents shall be brought directly against the insurer, and the employer or
insured shall be released from any further liability. Provided that in case of
insolvency or bankruptcy of such insurance company, the1 employer shall not
be released from liability under the provisions of this act." Held, that the claim
2
was barred by the statute of non-claim, since it represented an absolute obligation of the employer at the time of his death. Stitz v. Ryan, 256 N. W. 173
(Minn. 1934).
Although numerous decisions have sought to define the nature of an employer's obligation under a Workmen's Compensation Act, the instant case, by
weight of authority seems to be in the other direction. Rooke v. Langdon, 2 L. T. 495 (V. C.
Ct. 1844) ; In the goods of Dadds, i Deane Ecc. 290 (Pr. Ct. 1857) ; In the goods of Brewster, 29 L. J. (N. s.) 69 (P. 1859) ; Re Tobey, 6 Ont. Pr. 272 (1876) ; Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2
P. D. 251 (2877) ; cf. Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286, 303 (1863) ; Matter of McGill, 229 N.
Y. 405, 411, 128 N. E. 194, 196 (192o) ("It is not within the legitimate power of the courts
to dispense with the requirements of statute in the execution or revocation of wills and accept
even a definite intention to perform the prescribed act in connection therewith or the act itself.
Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, [3 AtI. 604 (885)]").
8. Cf. D'Huart v. Harkness, 34 Beav. 324 (Ch. 1865) ; Murphy v. Deichler, [29o9] A. C.
446; In re Pryce, [1911] 2 Ch. 286; In re Simpson, [1916] I Ch. 502; In re Lewal's Settlement Trusts, [I918] 2 Ch. 391. But cf. it re Kirwan's Trusts, 25 Ch. D. 373 (883) ; Hummel v. Hummel, [1898] I Ch. 642.
9.In the goods of Dadds, I Deane Ecc. 29o (Pr. Ct. 1857) (authorized burning of will,
with intent to revoke, not in testatrix's presence, held no revocation) ; Re Tobey, 6 Ont. Pr.
272 (1876) (under statute similar to Wills Act, destruction with intent to revoke by testator's
order in his own house, but not in his presence, held no revocation) ; Cheese v. Lovejoy, 2 P.
D. 252 (1877) (where testator drew his pen through various parts of will, wrote "This is
revoked" on back of it, and discarded it among waste-papers where it lay seven years, being
found by servants, held there was still no revocation complying with the Wills Act).
io. Nelson v. Public Administrator, 2 Bradf. 22o (N. Y. 1852) (separate paper declaring revocation of testator's will, signed by him, but not attested as required by statute, held no
revocation of a will) ; Tynan v. Paschal, 27 Tex. 286 (1863) (letter from decedent to his attorney in fact directing him to destroy his will held to be no ipso facto revocation of it) ; see
Dower v. Seeds, 28 W. Va. 113, 137 (1886) (where burning of will by testator's direction but
not in his presence was declared no revocation) ; cf. Bayley v. Bailey, 59 Mass. 245 (2849);
Hollingshead v. Sturgis, 21 La. Ann. 450 (1869).
ii.Supra notes 6 and 8.
I. MIum. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4289.
except "contingent
2. This statute required presentation of claims arising upon contract
claims arising on contract which do not become absolute and capable of liquidation before
final settlement". MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8812.

RECENT CASES

virtue of its peculiar facts, produced a ruling of unique precision. 3 Clearly,
the decisions against the employer after the insurance company's default are not
determinative of his liability before such default. 4 However, in dicta accompanying those holdings and in related cases, the respective positions of insurance company and employer have been variously stated as: surety and principal,5 indemnitor and indemnitee,6 and joint and several obligors.7 On the
other hand certain statutes have been held to relieve the employer of all responsibility after he has obtained the proper insurance.' The court in the principal case, disregarding that language of the local act which favored interpretation of the employer's liability as contingent and secondary, followed dicta of
foreign jurisdictions declaring the obligation to be of a primary nature. 9 Since
plaintiffs here could scarcely have been expected to realize that they had any
claim against the employer's estate at the time of its administration, the pronounced effort of the court to escape the language of the statute appears unjustified. Furthermore, in view of the statutory requirement of insurance,'"
and the resulting fact that a solvent insurer bears the ultimate burden under
any interpretation, it seems only reasonable to hold the employer free from
liability until the insurer defaults. Such a definition of the obligation precludes
molestation of the employer as long as the insurance company is solvent, gives
the employee ample relief in the event of the insurer's default,1 and achieves
a result more equitable than that reached in the instant case.'
3. Witchekowski v. The Falls Co., 105 Conn. 737, 136 Atl. 565 (1927) [following CONN.
GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5285] ; see Matter of Winfield v. New York Central R. R., 168 App.
Div. 351, 353, 153 N. Y. Supp. 499, 5oi (3d Dep't 1915) ; United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. v. Booth, 164 Tenn. 41, 45, 45 SJ W. (2d) 1075, lo76 (1932),; Anderson-Berney
Realty Co. v. Soria, 41 S. W. (2d) 279, 282 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) [interpreting TEx. STAT.
(1928) c. 8306, § 3].
4. See Savannah Lumber Co. v. Burch, I65 Ga. 7o6, 710, 142 S. E. 83, 86 (1928) ; Biggs
v. First Nat. Bank of Fort Dodge, 254 N. W. 331, 333 (Iowa 1934) [construing IOwA CODE
(931) § 1378]; Atlas Wiring Co. v. Dorchester, 32 P. (2d) 913, 919 (Okla. 1934) ; American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 55 Utah 483, 489, 187 Pac. 633, 635 (1920).
5. See Brenner v. Brenner, 127 Md. 189, 194, 96 Atl. 287, 289 (1915).
6. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S: 53Q, 541 (933) ; Elliot v. Elliot Bros., 165
Tenn. 23, 27, 52 S. W. (2d) 144, 146 (1932).
7. See Collins v. Murray, 164 Tenn. 58o, 583, 51 S. W. (2d) 834, 835 (1932).
8. Weiser v. Industrial Accident Comm., 172 Cal. 538, 157 Pac. 593 (1916) [followifig
CArL GEN. LAWs (Deering, 1931) c. 4749, § 30] ; see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Incinerator Co., 51 F. (2d) 739, 742 (S. D. N. Y. 1931); N. Y. CoNsoL. LAws (Cahill, 193o)
c. 66, § 53; TEX. STAT. (1928) c. 8306, § 3.
9. The court cited Collins v. Murray, 164 Tenn. 58o, 5, S. W. (2d) 834 (1932), and
American Fuel Co. v. Indust. Comm., 55 Utah 483, 187 Pac. 633 (1920). Principal case at
175.

1O. MINN.

STAT.

(Mason, 1927) § 4288.

ii. For statement of policy advocating imposition of joint and several liability against

insurer and employer see Witchekowski v. The Falls Co., 1O5 Conn. 737, 74o, 136 Atl. 565,
567 (1927). Among jurisdictions supporting this view are Illinois and Pennsylvania. See
ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 48, § 228; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit. 77, § 921.
12. Had the Minnesota Compensation Act been compulsory instead of giving employer
and employee an option to reject its provisions as the basis of determining the employer's liability (MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 4271), the plaintiff's claim in this case would not have
been one "arising out of contract"; it would have been based on status. See Lane v. Industrial Comm., 54 F. (2d) 338, 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). The local statute of non-claim did not
cover such obligations. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8812.

